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BALANCING POWER IN THE U.S. RESPONSE TO
EXTERNAL THREATS: NSA SURVEILLANCE AND
GUANTÁNAMO DETENTION
Jameel Jaffer*
I am going to talk about legal challenges to surveillance con-
ducted by the NSA—the National Security Agency. It may not be
immediately obvious to you what this topic has to do with Guantá-
namo, beyond the fact that the administration has defended its sur-
veillance policies, like its detention policies, by reference to the
threat of international terrorism.  But, in fact, the two contexts
raise some of the same legal questions.  In particular, the two con-
texts raise similar questions about the respective roles of the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches in determining the nation’s
response to external threats.
In the area of national security policy—though not only in this
area—the current administration has taken a capacious view of ex-
ecutive authority and it has taken a correspondingly circumscribed
view of the authority possessed by the two other branches.  Thus at
various times over the last five years, the administration has pro-
posed that the executive branch possesses exclusive or near-exclu-
sive authority to determine, among other things, what
interrogation methods may be used against suspected terrorists;
whether individuals—including U.S. citizens—ought to be de-
tained without charge as enemy combatants; and what rules should
apply in the military’s prosecution of foreign enemy combatants
charged with war crimes.  When pressed to identify the source of
this sweeping authority, the administration has pointed to two
things.  It has pointed, first, to Congress’s September 2001 Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which empowers the
President to take action against those responsible for the Septem-
ber 11th attacks and against those who harbored them.  And, more
radically, the administration has pointed to Article II of the Consti-
tution, which, it says, not only empowers the President to protect
the nation against foreign threats, but also renders unconstitu-
tional Congress’s efforts to regulate this power.
This theory of executive power was tested to some degree in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 which addressed the Executive’s authority to
* Deputy Director, National Security Program, American Civil Liberties Union.
1 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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detain combatants seized on the battlefield, and in Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld,2 which addressed the Executive’s authority to convene mili-
tary tribunals.  But I think it is the National Security Agency cases
that will be the real crucible.
Most of the NSA cases—and there are a number of them
now—grow out of the same set of facts.  In early 2006, the New York
Times disclosed that President Bush had authorized the NSA to
conduct foreign intelligence wiretaps inside the United States with-
out compliance with FISA—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act—which is a statute that Congress enacted in 1978 to govern the
collection of foreign intelligence inside the United States.3  FISA
allows the FBI wide latitude to monitor the communications of
people who are thought to be agents of foreign governments or of
foreign terrorist organizations.4  However, the statute also includes
important safeguards against abuse.  It sets out specific procedures
that the executive branch must follow in order to initiate foreign
intelligence surveillance inside the United States.  The executive
must submit a written application to a specially constituted intelli-
gence court.  The application must show that a “significant pur-
pose” of the surveillance is to gather information about foreign
threats to the country—rather than, for example, to gather evi-
dence of criminal activity by purely domestic groups.  And the ap-
plication must show what’s called “foreign intelligence probable
cause”—that is, probable cause to believe that the target of the sur-
veillance is the agent of a foreign government, political group, or
terrorist group.
The NSA program, as described by senior administration offi-
cials, does not comply with any of those requirements.5  According
to public statements by administration officials, the program in-
volves, among other things, the warrantless interception of tele-
phone calls that originate or terminate inside the United States.
The interceptions are not subject to judicial oversight, and they are
not based on probable cause.  Instead, these interceptions are initi-
ated on the basis of a NSA shift supervisor’s unilateral determina-
tion that one party to the communication is “linked,” in some
unspecified sense of the word, to a terrorist organization.
The administration announced in January that it was bringing
2 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
3 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
4 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (2004).
5 See supra note 3, at A1.
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the program within the authority of the FISA court, at least tempo-
rarily.6  But it continues to insist that the program was legal, and it
has expressly reserved the authority to resurrect the program at
any time.  For all we know, it has been resurrected already.
It is somewhat difficult to understand why the administration
ever thought the program was necessary at all.  FISA’s require-
ments are not particularly onerous for the executive branch.  In
fact, the procedures are considerably less onerous than the ones
that apply in criminal cases.  In addition, FISA includes an emer-
gency exception, for exigent circumstances, and it includes a provi-
sion that allows warrantless surveillance for fifteen days after a
declaration of war.  FISA, therefore, is not particularly burden-
some.  In drafting the legislation, Congress anticipated exigent cir-
cumstances, emergencies, and even war.
Nor is the FISA court unsympathetic to the executive branch.
The FISA court meets in secret, allows only the government to ap-
pear before it, and does not ordinarily publish its decisions.  Over
the last twenty-five years, the Executive has submitted to the FISA
court on the order of 20,000 surveillance applications, and of those
20,000 applications, the FISA court has denied only four.  I do not
want to say that the FISA court is simply a rubberstamp; I do not
think that is entirely true.  But the statistics are certainly suggestive,
and it is difficult to believe that FISA has really been an impedi-
ment to the administration’s intelligence efforts.
For whatever reason, though, the administration decided five
years ago that it was going to inaugurate a domestic surveillance
program outside the FISA framework and a program of warrantless
wiretapping inside the nation’s borders.
Now, as I said, the administration argues that Congress author-
ized the program through the Authorization to Use Military Force
Act.7  Here’s the key sentence from a brief that the government
recently filed in the Sixth Circuit: “Because the collection of for-
eign intelligence about the enemy in wartime is a fundamental and
time-honored incident of armed conflict, such intelligence gather-
ing is ‘unmistakably’ covered by Congress’s Authorization for the
Use of Military Force . . . .”8  But it is difficult to believe that Con-
6 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Judges and Justice Dept. Meet over Eavesdropping Program,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A14.
7 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
8 Brief for Appellants at *14, American Civil Liberties Union et. al. v. National
Security Agency et. al., Nos. 06-2095, 06-2140, 2006 WL 4055616 (6th Cir. Oct. 17,
2006) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004)).
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gress meant the AUMF to implicitly repeal a comprehensive for-
eign intelligence statute that has been on the books for almost
thirty years.  In fact, when Senator Arlen Specter was presented
with the administration’s argument, he had this to say: “I do not
think that any fair, realistic reading of the [AUMF] gives [the Presi-
dent] the power to conduct electronic surveillance.”9  And Senator
Specter was not the only one to offer this view.  Senator Lindsey
Graham, Republican of South Carolina, said this: “I will be the first
to say when I voted for it, I never envisioned that I was giving to this
President or any other President the ability to go around FISA
carte blanche.”10  So the administration’s reliance on the AUMF is
pretty weak, and even Republican members of Congress are saying
so.
In fact, to accept the government’s position would require us
to conclude not only that the AUMF’s general language authorized
a program of judicially unsupervised electronic surveillance within
the nation’s borders, but also that the same general language im-
plicitly repealed FISA’s express prohibition of electronic surveil-
lance except under the terms of FISA itself.  As the Supreme Court
has said repeatedly, repeals by implication are rarely recognized
and can be established only by overwhelming evidence that Con-
gress intended the repeal.  And there is no such evidence here.
So everything comes down to the government’s second de-
fense of the program, which is not a statutory argument but a con-
stitutional one.  The government argues that under the
Constitution, “[t]he ‘President alone’ is ‘invested with the entire
charge of hostile operations.’”11  In other words, the protection of
the nation from foreign threats is the exclusive domain of the exec-
utive branch.  To the extent that Congress has enacted legislation
that limits the President’s authority, the government says, the legis-
lation is unconstitutional.  This argument proposes a fairly radical
reconception of executive power.  Until now, it has been generally
accepted that, although the President is Commander-in-Chief, the
war and foreign affairs powers are shared between the President
and Congress.  The President has constitutional authority in these
areas, but Congress can regulate the President’s exercise of this
9 Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance Authority:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 12 (2006) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter).
10 Id. at 17 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham).
11 Brief for Appellants, supra note 8, at *45 (emphasis added) (internal citations R
omitted).
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authority.12
In fact, the Supreme Court said precisely this in Youngstown,
which involved President Truman’s attempted seizure of the na-
tion’s steel mills during the Korean War.13  In that case, the govern-
ment argued that the seizures were a permissible exercise of the
President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief and of the Presi-
dent’s “inherent” authority to respond to emergencies.14  But the
Court rejected this argument, finding that the President could not
constitutionally disregard a statute that implicitly prohibited the
seizures.15  Essentially, the Court held that the President did not
have the authority to disregard a duly enacted law.16  The Court
wrote, “The President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.  The Constitu-
tion limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he
thinks bad.”17
The current administration’s theory of executive power basi-
cally asks for a reconsideration of Youngstown.  It proposes, again,
that the President alone is invested with the entire charge of hos-
tile operations—and, even more troubling, that the President en-
joys this unfettered authority even as to operations that, like the
NSA program, are aimed principally at constitutionally protected
activity that takes place inside the nation’s borders.  This theory
proposes that the President can ignore the laws that Congress has
enacted in exercise of its own war powers.  But the Supreme
Court’s recent detention cases suggest that the Court is unlikely to
be sympathetic to this argument.18 Hamdan, again, involved the
President’s authority to convene military commissions that did not
comply with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.19  Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the Court, stated: “Whether or not the President
has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to
convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations
that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed
on his powers.”20  Justice Kennedy expanded on the same point in
12 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
13 Id. at 579.
14 Id. at 584.
15 Id. at 587–88.
16 Id. at 585–86.
17 Id. at 587.
18 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 2774 n.23 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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his concurrence:
This is not a case . . . where the Executive can assert some unilat-
eral authority to fill a void left by congressional inaction.  It is a
case where Congress, in the proper exercise of its powers as an
independent branch of government, and as part of a long tradi-
tion of legislative involvement in matters of military justice, has
considered the subject of military tribunals and set limits on the
President’s authority.21
The application of the Youngstown/Hamdan framework to the
NSA program is straightforward.  The Executive does not have the
authority to disregard FISA any more than it had the authority to
disregard the Uniform Code of Military Justice in Hamdan or the
Labor Management Relations Act in Youngstown.  Like the statutes
that were at issue in those cases, FISA was the result of “a delibera-
tive and reflective process engaging both of the political
branches.”22  In fact, when it was enacted, FISA was fully supported
by the President, the Attorney General, and the directors of the
FBI, CIA, and NSA.  In his signing statement, President Carter
characterized the statute as the result of “the legislative and execu-
tive branches of Government work[ing] together toward a com-
mon goal.”23  To use Justice Kennedy’s phrase, FISA was a law
“derived from the customary operation of the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches.”24  It is not open to the President simply to ignore
it.
The government argues that FISA is unconstitutional because
it infringes on the President’s constitutional authority.  But if the
NSA program conflicts with FISA (as the government has conceded
that it does), it is the NSA program, not FISA, that is unconstitu-
tional.  That is the clear import of Youngstown and Hamdan.  The
President might have constitutional authority to engage in warrant-
less foreign intelligence surveillance in the context of Congres-
sional silence; in fact some courts reached this conclusion before
FISA was enacted.25  But, through FISA, Congress has permissibly
acted in a field of shared constitutional authority to regulate the
exercise of the President’s power.  The Youngstown/Hamdan line of
cases makes clear that the President cannot simply ignore limita-
21 Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22 Id.
23 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Statement on Signing S. 1566 into
Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1853 (Oct. 25, 1978).
24 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25 U.S. v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Smith,
321 F.Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971)).
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tions that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own authority,
placed on his authority.
To understand the significance of the administration’s argu-
ment, you have to think about the other contexts in which Con-
gress has regulated the war or foreign affairs powers.  If it’s true
that Congress can’t regulate the President’s exercise of these pow-
ers, what other acts of Congress are unconstitutional?  When it
comes to national security policy, the administration wants a free
hand.  It wants a blank check.
With the administration ignoring FISA, it’s important to re-
member why Congress enacted the law in the first place.  During
the 1960s and 1970s, the executive branch conducted indiscrimi-
nate surveillance of civil rights activists and peaceful political orga-
nizations.26  For example, Martin Luther King, Jr., was the target of
an intensive FBI surveillance and harassment campaign meant to
“neutralize” him as a civil rights leader.27  A Senate Committee that
investigated this history in 1976 found “a clear and sustained fail-
ure by those responsible to control the intelligence community
and to ensure its accountability.”28  It was in response to this history
that Congress enacted FISA.  And it is FISA that the executive
branch is now disregarding.
26 See Scott Shane, For Some, Spying Controversy Recalls a Past Drama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
6, 2006, at A18.
27 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, UNITED STATES LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RE-
SPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, UNITED STATES SENATE (Washington, U.S. Gov’t.
Print. Off. 1976).
28 Id.

